













Is Learning by Migrating 




















Hitotsubashi University Research Unit 
for Statistical Analysis in Social Sciences 
A 21st-Century COE Program 
 
Institute of Economic Research   
Hitotsubashi University 
Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603 Japan 
http://hi-stat.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/ Is Learning by Migrating in Megalopolis Really Important?∗
Tomohiro Machikita
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Kunitachi, Tokyo 1868603 Japan
machi@ier.hit-u.ac.jp
First version: March, 2004
This version: February 28, 2005
Abstract
This paper examines learning by migrating eﬀects on the productivity of migrants who
move to the “megalopolis” from rural areas utilizing the Thailand Labor Force Survey Data.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop a simple framework to empirically test for
self-selection on the migration decision and learning by migrating. The role of the charac-
teristics of the urban labour market is also examined. In conclusion, we ﬁnd self-selection
eﬀects test (1) positive among new migrants from rural area (i.e. “new entrants” to the urban
labour market); and (2) negative among new migrants who move to rural areas (i.e. “new
exits” from the urban labour market). These results suggest a natural selection (survival of
the ﬁttest) mechanism exists in the urban labour market.
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11 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine learning by migrating eﬀects on the productivity of migrants
who move to the “megalopolis” from rural areas utilizing the Thailand Labor Force Survey Data,
1994 to 1996. The main contributions of this paper are: (1) providing a simple empirical frame-
work to identify between self-selection eﬀects in migration decision and learning by migrating
eﬀects; (2) discussing the role of the urban labour market (i.e. natural selection or location of
human capital accumulation). This study is one contribution of understanding about the unob-
served characteristics of migrants in concentrated area empirically. Policy makers, economists,
and researchers of other ﬁelds like sociology and anthropology have been interested in sorting
through urban immigration and unobserved heterogeneity of urban workers. Especially policy
makers, macroeconomists, and labour economists are interested in the role of such a concen-
trated area to provide job matching and its aggregate properties. Due to the causal eﬀects of
migration decisions and individual characteristics, it has been diﬃcult to identify the true im-
pact of concentrated area on migrant ʟ s wages and job matching. Thanks to exogenous sources
of variation (or natural experiments) in our available empirical data, the impact of migration
on wages is consistently estimated. Based on these estimates, we can start to discuss the role of
the urban labour market, active labour market policies, and its macroeconomic implications.
Trying to identify self-selection eﬀects and learning eﬀects is growing ﬁeld. This became
seriously concerned using repeated cross-section data and panel data. Using panel-data, Clerides
et al. (1998) studies similar question on the export market using panel-data. No empirical
evidence about learning eﬀects (i.e. improving productivity) by exporting are observed from
their analysis. Self-selection in the domestic market is the main explanation for becoming
exporters. Glaeser and Mar´ e (2001) ﬁnds learning by migrating eﬀects in cities after moving
from small cities to big cities. On the other hand, studying inside learning by migrating eﬀects
is also growing ﬁeld: Yamauchi (2003) ﬁnds the complementarities of schooling and experience
is reinforced as migrant’s experience increases in the destination market (Bangkok Metropolitan
Area) using Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994 to 1996. Using same data with Yamauchi (2003),
Yamauchi and Tanabe (2003) concludes that the employment probability of recent migrants is
negatively aﬀected by a large population size of previous migrants originating from the same
region and positively aﬀected if the previous migrants are successful in getting work. Kimura
(2004) examines the main explanations for urban wage premium: learning skills and learning job
opportunities in urban labour market using household-block-level data in Thailand Labor Force
Survey. Munshi (2003) focuses on employment at the destination among Mexican migrants in
the U.S. labour market. He uses rainfall in the origin (Mexico) as instrumental variable to
identify origin-communities network eﬀects on employment opportunities at the destination.
2The two unique characteristics in the available data are useful for our analysis, “the reason
for migration” and “duration of stay” for migrants. The variable “the reason for migration”
includes two types of migrants; job-seekers and migrants who move with the household head. The
location choice for job-seekers is self-selective on their observed and unobserved characteristics.
On the other hand, the location choice for migrants who move with the household head seems
to be independent of their characteristics. Location choice is exogenous for these household
migrants. We can observe that there is true location speciﬁc returns to migrants who move with
the household head. To see the degree of self-selection bias for job-seekers, this paper compares
the returns to location between job-seekers and household relations migrants. Clear results are
drawn from our identiﬁcation strategy. Our approach is similar to Gibbons and Katz (1991) and
Gibbons and Katz (1992), this paper is the ﬁrst attempt to identify self-selection and learning
eﬀects related to migration using exogenous sources of variation. On the other hand, the variable
“duration of stay” for migrants suggests the possibility of examining learning eﬀects of migration.
There is a large wage diﬀerence between short-staying and long-staying migrants in each location.
This pattern is quite diﬀerent for migration streams; rural-rural, urban-rural, rural-urban, and
urban-urban. Cohort diﬀerence provides the evidence of improving average productivity. The
cohort diﬀerence between the reasons for migration (i.e. diﬀerence in diﬀerences) also provides
the solution of the diﬀerence of learning by migrating eﬀects between two types of migrants.
The innovation of this work is that we utilize the experimental evidences from empirical data
to identify the self-selection of unobserved characteristics and examine the eﬀects of learning
by migrating in urban and rural area respectively. The main results are: ﬁrst, positive self-
selection among new migrants in the urban from rural areas (i.e. new entrants to the urban
labour market); secondly, negative self-selection among new migrants in rural areas (i.e. “new
exits” from the urban labour market). These results suggest a natural selection (survival of
the ﬁttest) mechanism exists in the urban labour market. Thirdly, a gap converges between
job-seekers and household relations for new migrants in urban area from rural area. Fourthly, a
gap converges between job-seekers and household relations for new migrants in rural area from
the urban labour market. “New exits” from the urban area seem to be portable of their acquired
skill potentially. These results show learning by migrating eﬀects in urban area over time.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a simple model to understand some
empirical hypotheses. Section 3 shows the structure of the dataset Thailand Labor Force Survey.
Section 4 contains a simple identiﬁcation framework to study self-selection eﬀects on unobserved
abilities and learning by migrating eﬀects. Section 5 while is about the estimation of self-selection
bias on individual characteristics, section 6 focuses on learning by migrating eﬀects. In the ﬁnal
section, we conclude this paper and discuss the remaining issues.
32 A Model of Mobility and Job Matching in Cities
This section shows a simple model of migration, mobility among occupations, and job matching.
The model is an extension of Neal (1999) with two-sided learning as in Jovanovic (1979) and
Gibbons and Katz (1992).1 The model provides a new approach to understanding the relation-
ship between migration, endogenous mobility, and quality of matching.2 The model provides
(1) new results of job mobility with two-sided learning and (2) simple framework to study an
empirical analysis. The sketch of the framework is the following. A young worker in the rural
area decides to stay or move to the urban area depending on job matching (i.e. wage) conditions.
Upon ﬁnding a good match in the urban area, the young worker stays in the urban area. If
otherwise, either the young worker continues to search for a new job, or returns to the rural.
2.1 Production Technology and Information Structures
Let us consider model settings similar to Neal (1999) with two-sided learning and migration
aspects. We assume that a young worker lives inﬁnitely and derives utility from two types of
matches: location θ and job ξ depicted by distribution, assumed to be known to the worker as
K(θ) and G(ξ) respectively. To incorporate two-sided learning into the model, we assume that
there is endowment for each worker, individual ability φ with vertical qualities from the distri-
bution Q(φ). The ﬁrm however, cannot observe individual ability ex-ante but has information
on a vector of observed individual characteristics X (i.e. gender, age, education) before hiring.
The true value of the job match is assumed to be revealed to both the ﬁrm and worker only after
hiring or while on the job. The worker decides to keep or to change her job match depending
on K(θ) and G(ξ). On the other hand, the ﬁrm ﬁres the worker when productivity φ is below
oﬀer ξ. Individual will stay at her job match ξ(φ) as long as individual ability φ is over an oﬀer







2.2 Migration and Job Mobility Decisions
The worker’s utility in period t is deﬁned by vt ≡ θt + ξt where each match is drawn at the
beginning of period t. The worker is assumed to maximize the expected value of v inﬁnitely
1Literature on two-sided learning spreads across many issues: see Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Gibbons
and Katz (1992), Topel and Ward (1993), and Farber and Gibbons (1996).
2Incorporating two-sided learning between ﬁrms and workers is also suggested by Neal (1999).
4with discount factor δ. The choice alternatives are restricted to three types in detail: she keep
pair of location and job matching (θ,φ) if and only if ξ<φ ; change her job if and only if ξ>φ ;
change her both matches if and only if ξ>φand depends on value of θ. For a given unobserved
ability by ﬁrm φ and observed characteristics X, the workers’ decision problem also can be
characterized by the following Bellman equation using the value of V (θ,ξ) like Neal (1999).
V (θ,ξ;φ,X)=θ + ξ + δ max
 
V0,E V (G),E V (K,G)
























V0 means value of match which worker keeps, EV(G) means value of match that she leaves her
current job and draws a new job, and EV(K,G) means that she leaves her current job-location
and introduces another round of draws.
Optimal policy can be derived from the above dynamic programming. Derivations follow
two processes: First, the condition of staying and keeping (θ,ξ(φ)) is examined. Secondly, we
get the condition of only changing her job (θ,ξ (φ)). By our deﬁnition, location change includes




≥ max[ EV(G),E V (K,G)]
Now we are able to solve for the job ξ to satisfy the above equation for a given location θ.
ξ∗(φ; θ) is deﬁned as a critical value; she stays as long as ξ ≥ ξ∗(φ; θ).
The second condition is also that the value of only changing jobs weakly dominates the value
of changing both location and jobs given our ﬁrst condition.
EV(G) ≥ EV(K,G)
We can also solve for location θ to satisfy the above equation. θ∗ is deﬁned as her threshold of
location choice. This critical value plays an important role on the policy to continue migrating
or moving as long as θ<θ ∗ with ξ ≥ ξ∗(φ; θ).
5Finally, the optimal policies for workers with endowment of abilities φ are summarized by
the decision below. The term Stay means that a young worker who keeps current location and
job matches (θ,φ). The term Draw ξ  is deﬁned as a young worker who changes jobs within
current location: rural to rural migrants and urban to urban migrants. The term Draw (θ ,ξ )
is also deﬁned as a young worker who changes jobs and location: rural to urban migrants and
urban to rural migrants.

    
    
Stay if ξ(φ) ≥ ξ∗(φ;θ),ξ< φ
Draw ξ  if θ>θ ∗,ξ (φ) <ξ ∗(φ;θ),ξ> φ
Draw (θ ,ξ )i f θ<θ ∗,ξ (φ) <ξ ∗(φ;θ),ξ> φ
These decision rules lead us to a second point: empirical analysis to location choice and
wages. Before we look into the relationship between location choice and wages, samples must
be clariﬁed by location indicator K ∈{ R,U} and migration indicator M ∈{ 0,1}. Location
indicator conﬁnes itself to rural (R) and urban (U) simply. Migration indicator also conﬁnes
itself to staying (M = 0) and moving (M = 1). For migrants, they have a new location indicator
K  ∈{ R,U}. Migration streams for migrants are constituted by these two location indicators
K and K . Whole population branches out into the subgroups of stayers: rural stayers DR
0 ,
urban stayers DU
0 and migrants by migration streams: rural to rural migrants DRR
1 , urban to
rural migrants DUR
1 , rural to urban migrants DRU





















1i f θR >θ ∗







1i f θU <θ ∗







1i f θR <θ ∗







1i f θU >θ ∗
U,ξ (φ)U <ξ ∗(φ;θU),ξ U >φ
0 otherwise
2.3 Testable Hypotheses
We can summarize our simple model to describe some testable hypotheses here. The dynamic
program for a young worker gives us the following theoretical implications. First, if the individual
ability is higher than current requirement of ﬁrm ξ and the wage is also higher than other value
of location change and job change, she will stay in current pair of matches (location, job).
Secondly, if ability is lower than current requirement of ﬁrm ξ and wage is also lower than other
value due to job change, then she will move to ﬁnd another job within her current location.
Thirdly, if ability is lower than current requirement of ﬁrm ξ and wage is also lower than other
value due to location change and job change, then she will move to another area to ﬁnd another
job. It is time now to put the empirical questions or some testable hypotheses regarding the
rural and urban labour markets: do individuals become more productive after moving to the
megalopolis?
Deﬁnition 1 Self-selection of abilities on migration:
Both observed characteristics X and unobserved abilities φ aﬀect the migration decision M
and choice of location K  considerably. The outcome of migration (θ,ξ ) or (θ ,ξ ) are positively
aﬀected by ex-ante characteristics and abilities.
Deﬁnition 2 Learning by migrating:
Location changes K  through the migration decision M aﬀect the individual unobserved abilities
φ. The outcome of migration (θ,ξ ) or (θ ,ξ ) is a function of ex-post characteristics and abilities.
Deﬁnition 3 Sorting eﬀects of reallocation:
Aggregate productivity q (φ,ξ;θ) for each group is aﬀected by the reallocation eﬀects in the local
labour market K irrespective of improved abilities due to migration.
The three testable hypotheses are drawn here simply. The ﬁrst hypothesis supports self-
selection in the migration decision: relatively eﬃcient individuals become migrants and these
individuals also have a good job-match in the new location. We test it for each migration
streams. The second hypothesis supports the improvement of average productivity over time:
the average performance of long-experienced migrants is better than short-experienced migrants
due to sorting or learning by migrating.
7Hypothesis 1 There is positive self-selection on individual abilities for “new entrants” to the
urban labour market. There is negative self-selection on individual abilities for “new exits” from
the urban labour market.
This hypothesis suggests that (1) a young worker who has high abilities moves from the rural to
the urban labour market and (2) a young worker who has low abilities moves from the urban to
the rural labour market. This implies a natural selection mechanism exists in the urban labour
market.
Hypothesis 2 Average productivity for a long staying is higher than a short staying in the rural
or the urban labour market through the two-sided learning process between ﬁrm and worker (i.e.
selection mechanism over time) or learning by migrating.
This hypothesis oﬀers that (1) sorting matters among the local labour market and (2) learning
by migrating exists in the local labour market.
Hypothesis 3 A young worker who had drawn bad matches since migrating to the urban area
does not stay long and tends to come back to the rural area.
This additional hypothesis supports the prediction of Rothschild’s two articles.3 This hypothesis
is formulated by the Rothschild’s prediction that the rural wage distribution is known but the
urban wage distribution is unknown to the rural worker. The migrants from the rural area
“experiment” in the urban labour market observing rural wages in the rural labour market.
3 Data on Migrants
In this section, we examine “the reason for migration” and “duration of migration” provide
statistical evidence based on the wages of migrants, utilizing data from Thailand Labor Force
Survey, 1994 to 1996. The data set presents three issues related to (1) geography; (2) the unique
characteristics of “the reason for migration” and “duration of migration”; (3) the evidence on
wages. In fact, the proper treatment of these issues provides the key to understanding the
self-selection mechanism and learning by migrating eﬀects for migrants.
3.1 Why Do We Focus on Thailand?
Let us start with focusing on the geography of Thailand. Table 1 exhibits the patterns of
urbanization of Thailand. We can observe a unique position of Thailand in the world from three
indices of urbanization patterns. Urban area is deﬁned as place with over a hundred thousand.
3Rothschild (1974a) and Rothschild (1974b) studies micro-foundation of search strategy when the price distri-
bution is unknown for new market.
8This criteria is lower bound of the deﬁnition of urban area.4 Primacy means the level of urban
primacy: ratio of urban population residing in Bangkok to second largest city. Urban primacy of
Thailand (about 25) is the highest value of the world. Megalopolitan means the ratio of Bangkok
to whole city in Thailand. Almost 77% of urban residents concentrates in Bangkok. These two
indices show agglomeration of economic activity in Bangkok and also represent that there is
only one megalopolis in Thailand. Finally, Urbanization means the ratio of the number of urban
residents to whole domestic population. Only 15% of the whole population is located in urban
areas (i.e. almost 85% of population is located in rural areas.). These indices eloquently show
a clear contrast between urban and rural areas in Thailand.
These indices of economic geography in Thailand can simplify our empirical analysis. But
it is diﬃcult to see above clear contrast utilizing USA data, for example, recent literatures on
labour migration in USA: Glaeser and Mar´ e (2001), Borjas et al. (1992), Wheeler (2001), Dahl
(2002), Moretti (2003a), Moretti (2003b). Many big cities seem to distribute discretely in USA.
If we utilize USA data, then we have to set up multiple discrete choice models. We refer to
the Greater Bangkok Area as the urban area. We assume that workers can commute to center
of Bangkok as long as they locate in GBA. GBA seems a kind of basin of attraction. We also
deﬁne all rural areas as non-GBA.
3.2 Overview of the Thailand Labor Force Survey
We shall examine our pooled sample of the Thailand Labor Force Survey (We call LFS hereafter).
LFS is random sampling of all households in Thailand taken during two survey rounds. It is
two rounds (February and August) every year. This paper pools annual sample of LFS, 1994
to 1996. We do not add our sample to the LFS, from 1997 to present. But the impacts
were uneven for each occupation and industry. The number of pooled observations adds up
to approximately one million. This paper leaves out of agricultural and self-employed workers,
housewives, and students. The results are a sample of 250,000 wages workers in which 56.634
are migrant workers. We concentrate on this sample in this paper. We do not examine about
200,000 staying (i.e. non migrants) among sample of wages workers here. The main contents of
LFS are following: gender, age, years of education, weekly wage, bonus, occupation, industry,
ﬁrm size, unemployment spells, the reason for migration, and length of stay when the survey
was taken.
For the moment let us look at our key variables for empirical analysis closely. Variables such
4We should notice that this criteria is correlated with domestic population. For example, USA seems to easy
to satisfy this criteria because USA has a population of about two hundred million of population. On the other
hand, Thailand (0.6 hundred millions of population ≈ 3/10 of USA) is not easy to satisfy this.
9as “the reason for migration” and “length of stay when the survey was taken” (or duration,
exposure to destination) have unique characteristics. Variable “the reason for migration” can
be grouped into seven categories: (1) Job search; (2) Job transfer; (3) Education/Training; (4)
Medical treatment; (5) Move with household head; (6) Back to former place of residence; and
(7) Other reasons. These reasons are automatically recorded for migrants who have 0 to 4 years
of experience in each destination. Next, duration or exposure to each destination is recorded
for migrants who also have 0 to 4 years of experience in each destination.5 We tabulate the
relationship between the reason for migration and duration of destination in Table 2. The main
groups are job-hunting, job transfer, and move with household head. Migration attributed to
study purpose also constitutes about 10% of all migrants. First, the tension of exit rises to the
peak at within the ﬁrst year of the move and after 3 years for migrants due to looking for jobs.
On the other hand, the tension of exit also rises to a peak after 3 years for migrants due to job
transfer and for migrants who move with the household head.
3.3 Evidence on Wages by Migration Status
Based on the length of stay in migrant primacy destination, we shall classify migrants into two
main groups: (A) Job search, job transfer, and other reason; (B) Move with the household
head. We call the former group “Job related” simply. This distinct classiﬁcation is useful
for our identiﬁcation and estimation in the next section. Secondly, migration streams are also
divided into four types: (1) from rural to rural migrants; (2) from urban to rural migrants;
(3) from rural to urban migrants; (4) from urban to urban migrants. Thirdly, the duration of
migrant status is divided into two categories: short (0-2 years) and long (3-4 years) duration.
All migrants are classiﬁed by reason of migration, migration streams, and length of stay.
We are now ready to see the evidence of wages on each migration status. We assume two
labour markets: rural and urban; First, we see the sample of new entrants to the rural labour
market from rural areas. Secondly, we also see the sample of new entrants to the rural labour
market from the urban area. Mean, standard deviations, and the number of observation are
shown in each cell by migration status. The descriptive statistics for new entrants to the rural
labour market is shown in Table 3, using whole sample, and the two subsample for job search,
and move with household head respectively. Comparing the wage diﬀerentials in the sample
of rural-rural migrants, there is a gradual growth (from 6.771 to 6.993) in the long-staying
migrants looking for jobs. There is also a gradual growth (from 6.763 to 6.801) in the long
staying migrants due to household reasons. Next, we shall discuss the diﬀerence between the
5Migrants who have 5 to 9 years of experience are also recorded. But these migrants do not have any record
of original area, unable us to specify their migration streams from original area to destination area. Thus, we do
not include these migrants who have 5 to 9 years of experience in our empirical analysis.
10reasons for migration. The level of wages is higher for migrants looking for jobs than migrants
moving with household head. This diﬀerence seems to be represented by gender. The ratio of
females to new migrants due to household related reasons is almost 60%.
We also see that there is a rapid growth (from 6.81 to 7.058 for new entrants of looking for
job and from 6.707 to 6.88 for new entrants of move with household head) in the members of
the long cohort group in the urban to rural sample. And we also see wage diﬀerentials between
the reasons for migration. Over 60% are females in the new migrants due to household related
reasons in this sample. Finally, we compare the wage diﬀerentials between migration streams:
from rural to rural and from urban to rural. The level of wage is higher for migrants from urban
areas except for the subsample of migrants due to household related reasons. This fact seems
to be represented by age diﬀerentials between two migration streams.
The descriptive statistics for new entrants to the urban labour market is shown in Table
4. After we compare the wage diﬀerentials between the short and long-staying migrants from
rural to urban areas, there is a rapidly increasing (from 6.721 to 6.878) number of a long-staying
migrants looking for jobs. We shall consider the diﬀerence between the reasons for migration
next. The level of wages is higher for migrants due to household related reasons than migrants
looking for jobs. This diﬀerence maybe attributed to the age and gender characteristics of this
subsample. Our sample is restricted to wage workers. Reservation wage is high for females
who comprise the majority of migrants due to household related subgroup. The diﬀerence of
mean age between migrants looking for job and migrants who move with the household head is
approximately 5 years.
Looking at the urban-urban category, we also see that there is a rapid growth (from 7.074
to 7.252) in the number of long-staying migrants looking for jobs. There is likewise a sharp
growth (from 7.058 to 7.271) in the number of long-experienced for migrants who move with the
household head. Finally, wage diﬀerentials between migration streams: from rural to urban and
from urban to urban. As expected, the level of wage is quite higher for new entrants from urban
areas than new entrants from rural areas. This is most likely due to diﬀerentials with respect to
age, urban experience (i.e. beneﬁt from search within urban area or improving productivity),
and sectors (i.e. formal and informal) between the migration streams. This paper does not
mention about the dataset on occupation, industry, and ﬁrm sizes in LFS.
114 Identiﬁcation
This section provides a simple framework to empirically test to our hypotheses. We assume
that a young worker has all the information to evaluate his or her own ability as well as the
returns to this ability. It is easy for us to imagine correlation among own ability, migration
decision, and returns to ability. If there is a self-selection bias in the migration decision, then
we cannot evaluate the true learning eﬀects in urban area. This paper proposes a new method
to evaluate self-selection and learning by migrating eﬀects utilizing the unique characteristics
of Thailand Labor Force Survey: “the reason for migration” and “length of stay” for migrants.
Our identiﬁcation approach is quite diﬀerent from Clerides et al. (1998) which studies learning
by exporting eﬀects among new establishments using panel-data. And our approach also quite
diﬀerent from Glaeser and Mar´ e (2001) which examines learning eﬀects in cities using panel-data.
4.1 Identiﬁcation strategy
First, every worker has to choose migration decision every period: stay in current labour market
or move to another area. We call this decision variable M ∈{ 0,1}. Staying is captured by
M = 0 and mover is also captured by M = 1. This paper restricts our analysis for movers
(i.e. M = 1). Secondly, every worker chooses their labour market every period: rural or urban
labour market. We also call this location choice variable K ∈{ R,U}. Rural worker is captured
by K = R and urban worker is also captured by K = U. Thirdly, we deﬁne the variable
Z ∈{ 0,1} which is “the reason for migration” for movers. The reasons of migration for movers
are (1) Looking for job (i.e. job search), (2) Job transfer; (3) Education/Training; (4) Medical
treatment; (5) Move with household head; (6) Back to former residence, and (7) Others. With
respect to household related reasons of migration, we assume that the member moving with the
household head is captured by Z = 1 and the member of actively seeking employment or another
reason is captured by Z = 0. These bring us to the second point: description of decision and
state space for each individual.
Assumption 1 (A decision space).
Let a decision space D is constituted by below three elements: migration decision M; location
choice K; reason of migration Z. Let these choices are mapped from the elements in a real
ﬁnite dimensional set X,Φ,Θ,Ξ: the individual characteristics x ∈ X, the individual speciﬁc
abilities φ ∈ Φ, the location speciﬁc returns θ ∈ Θ, the job speciﬁc returns ξ ∈ Ξ such that
FD :( x, φ, θ, ξ) −→ D = M × K × Z
Assumption 2 (A state space).
Let a state space Y for each individual is also constituted by the individual characteristics,
12the individual speciﬁc abilities, the location speciﬁc returns, the job speciﬁc returns, and the
individual decision space as
FY :( x, φ, θ, ξ, D) −→ Y
These assumptions of decision and state space will lead us further into a empirical inves-
tigation. We assume that the household head decides whether his family migration or not.
Therefore we use the heterogeneity in the reason for migration as exogenous sources of variation
in endogenous variables. This paper constructs the household related dummy variables D1H.I f
a young worker follows the household head to move, then econometrician will treat the member
of D1H = 1. If the job-seekers move, D1H = 0. The indicator variable DK





1i f Z =1 ,K for M =1
0i f Z =0 ,K for M =1
The outcome variables for individual worker i in location K and at survey week s is deﬁned
Y K
is . The cross-section outcome function is formalized as an additive separable form.
Y K
is = f(Xis)+Γ· DK
1H + g (φis,ξ is)
where f(X) is a function of a vector of observed individual characterisitics, DK
1H is a dummy
variable equal to one if individual i follows the household head to move to location K, and
g (φis,ξ is) is a function of unobserved characteristics for an individual worker and ﬁrm: φis is
an error term for unobserved abilities for individual i at survey week s, and unobserved ﬁrm
speciﬁc characteristics ξis.
The choice of location K correlates to pecuniary returns to individual characteristics: ob-
served component Xi and component of unobserved ability φi. The high frequency of moving
to urban area for young and more educated is a known and observed ﬁrst. Young and highly
educated workers know the urban area to be a thick labour market (varieties in occupation, in-
dustry, and technology). The returns to schooling is also higher in urban areas. Recent literature
Borjas et al. (1992), Wheeler (2001), Dahl (2002), Moretti (2003a), and Moretti (2003b) show
this using USA data. This is the logic of self-selection. The location choice K of the migrant in
the household related subgroup (Z = 1) is assumed to be orthogonal to her ability φ and the
location choice K of the migrant job-related subgroup (Z = 0) is assumed to be non-orthogonal
to her ability φ by deﬁnition.
φi ∝ DR
1H =0 ,D U
1H =0
φi ⊥ DR
1H =1 ,D U
1H =1
13Undoubtedly, a worker in the local labour market K have a location speciﬁc premium,
however, the econometrician cannot distinguish between the true premiums in location and the
self-selection bias in the migration decision. Our identiﬁcation method suggests that move with
household head is exogenous on migration decision. And we can call the member of D1H =1
treatment group. We can examine the true eﬀects of moving to local labour market K on
individual outcome to see the coeﬃcient Γ. The coeﬃcient Γ means the premium diﬀerentials
between household related (D1H = 1) and of job related (D1H = 0) subgroup in location K.
This paper develops a new and a simple identiﬁcation method to distinguish between the true
premium in K and the impact of self-selection bias in the migration decision to K.
Next, this paper tries to identify learning by migrating eﬀects (i.e. productivity increasing
on migration) in location K. For example, learning by migrating eﬀects in urban areas include
formal training, learning by doing, knowledge spillovers by communication, reduction in mis-
match by turnover, and R&D investments by ﬁrms. We assume that ﬁrms can oﬀer a wage after
removing the returns to investment in technology. If this assumption is valid, then we will be
able to exclude the latest possibility of learning by migrating eﬀects: investment in technology
by ﬁrm. Now we may restrict our discussion on learning eﬀects due to individual eﬀorts (i.e.
learning and job turnover) and spillovers.
We use the variable τ for duration of stay after migration τ and relate this to experience
in K to study learning eﬀects. The data “length of migrant stay” τ ∈{ 0,1,2,3,4} years is
useful in identiﬁcation of learning by migrating eﬀects. This paper divides years T ∈{ S,L}
according to the duration of stay τ. The short-staying migrant worker is captured by T = S.
The longer-staying migrant worker is captured by T = L. We deﬁne (1) short experience as
S ∈{ 0,1,2} years and (2) long experience as L ∈{ 3,4} years of moving to current location K
based on the survey week. We are also now able to expand individual decision space from D to
DT with duration of stay.
Assumption 3 (A decision space with duration).
Let a decision space DT is constituted by below four elements: migration decision; location
choice; reason of migration; length of stay. Let these choices are mapped from the elements in
a real ﬁnite dimensional set X,Φ,Θ,Ξ: the individual characteristics x ∈ X, the individual
speciﬁc abilities φ ∈ Φ, the location speciﬁc returns θ ∈ Θ, the job speciﬁc returns ξ ∈ Ξ such
that
FDT :( x, φ, θ, ξ ) −→ DT = M × K × Z × T
Assumption 4 (A state space with duration).
Let a state space YT is expanded by duration of stay. Individual state also can be mapped from
14the observed characteristics, the individual speciﬁc abilities, the location speciﬁc returns, the job
speciﬁc returns, and individual decision space with the dimension of length of stay as
FYT :( x, φ, θ, ξ, DT) −→ YT
These assumptions lead to empirical study on the learning by migration. We construct the
dummy variable DK
1H(S) = 1 if individual i moved to K due to household related reasons and
had spent short years until the time the survey was taken. The indicator variable for short




1i f Z =1 ,K for M =1∩ T = S,
0i f Z =0 ,K for M =1∩ T = S.
We also construct the dummy variable DK
1H(L) = 1 if individual i moved due to household
related reasons to K and stayed long years after migration. The indicator variable for long




1i f Z =1 ,K for M =1∩ T = L,
0i f Z =0 ,K for M =1∩ T = L.
These indicator variables suggest the time diﬀerentials of self-selection between the members
of the short and long cohort groups. That is, the diﬀerentials between coeﬃcients of dummy
variables DK
1H(S) and DK
1H(L) can show the time diﬀerentials of learning eﬀects between the
two types of migrants. The outcome variables for individual worker i in location K is deﬁned
by Y K
is . The cross-section outcome function is also formalized in the equation.
Y K
is = f(Xis)+Γ ( S) · DK
1H(S)+Γ ( L) · DK
1H(L)+g (φis,ξ is)
where f(X) is a function of vector of observed individual characterisitics, DK
1H is a dummy
variable equal to one if individual i moves due to household related reasons to K, and g (φis,ξ is)
is a function of unobserved characteristics: φis is an error term for unobserved abilities, and ξis
is unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics for employee i.
5 Testing for Self-selection on Migration
5.1 Speciﬁcation and Estimation of Self-selection on Migration
First, we test one of our hypotheses: there is a self-selection bias on ability when a young worker
moves to location K. Outcome variable is the level of wage. Wage represents self-selection
15about employment and productivity. To test for self-selection in observed characteristics and
unobserved abilities, we estimate reason diﬀerentials from the cross-section wage function
like Gibbons and Katz (1991) and Gibbons and Katz (1992) by following their linear regression
formulations:
logWK
is = Xisβ +Γ· DK
1H + φis + ξK
is (1)
where the dependent variable logWK
is is log weekly earnings for individual i at survey week s in
location K, X is a vector of observed individual characteristics (gender, age, education, square
of years of education, and marital status), the dummy variable DK
1H = 1 if individual i moves to
location K due to household related reasons, and otherwise if individual i moves to location K
to actively seek employment. φis is unobserved abilities for individual i, ξK
is is unobserved ﬁrm
technology if individual i is employed in this ﬁrm. Finally, uK
is is a mixed error component of
φis and ξK
is.
5.2 Empirical Results of Self-selection on Migration
The expected sign of the estimates on self-selection are as follows. First, the coeﬃcient Γ of
urban-rural migrant is positive (i.e. migrants of job-seekers receive lower rural premium than
migrants of the household relations because of the negative self-selection on exit decision from
the urban labour market).
H0 :Γ UR < 0
H1 :Γ UR > 0 (negative self-selection for job-seekers)
Secondly, the coeﬃcient Γ of rural-urban migrant is negative (i.e. migrants of job-seekers
receive higher urban premium than the migrants of the household relations because of the
positive self-selection on entry decision to the urban labour market).
H0 :Γ RU ≥ 0
H1 :Γ RU < 0 (positive self-selection for job-seekers)
The estimates for the four subsamples urban (rural) migrants to urban (rural) areas in
Table 5 provide evidence that there are highly signiﬁcant on self-selection eﬀects on unobserved
abilities: (1) there is positive self-selection for new entries to both the urban and rural labour
markets from rural areas; (2) there is negative self-selection for newly exits from urban labour
market and movers within urban area. The estimates show that the household related subgroup
16has approximately 4.5% lower wages migrants in the job related subgroup in the rural to rural
subsample. Alternatively, the estimates show that job-seeking migrants earn 4.5% higher wages
than migrants in the household related subgroup. Job turnovers established residences in the
rural area have positive self-selection eﬀects. For the urban to rural subsample, results show that
there is a negative and highly signiﬁcant self-selection bias on unobserved abilities for job-seeking
migrants who have 5.1% lower wages than movers with household head.
On average, job-seeking migrants in the urban-rural subsample have 5.1% lower level of rural
true premium than migrants in the household related subgroup. Namely, if job-seeking subgroup
sample have same level of ability as the household related subgroup, the job search sample will
have true rural premium. Therefore, “low ability” of job search sample reduce their own rural
premium from true rural premium to lower level. Almost urban to rural movers were migrants
to urban area from rural area.
For the rural-urban and urban-urban subgroups, migrants with household related reasons
have true urban premium independent of self-selection eﬀects with respect to location choice and
ability by our identiﬁcation strategy in the previous section. The coeﬃcient of this dummy vari-
able means the diﬀerential of unobserved ability from urban premium. Estimates for rural-urban
subsample appears that positive and highly signiﬁcant self-selection bias on unobserved abilities
for job-seekers who have 8.8% higher wages than the household related control group. Estimates
for the job-seeking migrants in the rural-urban subsample indicate positive self-selection eﬀects
on abilities. Estimates for the urban-urban subsample also show that negative and signiﬁcant
self-selection eﬀects on unobserved ability for migrant job-seekers who have 5.1% lower wages
than those in the household related control group. Turnovers of a job and established a residence
in the urban area do not seem to have positive self-selection eﬀects.
We are now ready to say that there is positive and quite signiﬁcant (1% level) self-selection
eﬀects on unobserved abilities for migrants from rural areas: rural to rural and rural to urban
subsamples. But on average, there is a signiﬁcant negative self-selection bias on unobserved
abilities for migrants from urban areas: urban to rural and urban to urban subsamples.6 In
conclusion, young migrants from rural areas show clearly their high ability reﬂected on wages in
rural and urban areas on the average. Our model predicts that a migrant with high ability can
keep a job as long as she obtains a job requiring skill/training/know-how early in the migration
process.
6These results support the “lemon” eﬀects for migrants from urban area. On the other hand, these results also
support the no lemon eﬀect for migrants from rural area.
17Migrants who ﬁnd jobs choose to stay. But migrants who cannot ﬁnd a job will return to
their place of origin or move to another location to seek jobs. Both of rural movers from urban
area and urban movers from urban area seem to have bad match in urban area. But results using
the urban to rural and urban to urban subsamples (see Table 5) show that there are less learning
eﬀects in urban area for job-seeking subgroup than the household related subgroup. If there are
positive spillovers in the urban area, the certain gaps between the two types of migrants mean
that there is heterogeneity in learning by migrating eﬀects in urban areas.
6 Testing for Learning by Migrating
6.1 Speciﬁcation and Estimation of Learning by Migrating
We test our next hypothesis on learning by migrating eﬀects to improve productivity after a
young worker moves to location K. Learning by migrating eﬀects are mentioned by Glaeser and
Mar´ e (2001) using panel regressions. This is comprehensive work. But there are shortcomings
about self-selection bias on migration decision.
Outcome variable is also wage level. We divide the explanatory variable DK
1H into short
DK
1H(S) and long DK
1H(L) cohort. Testing for learning by migrating eﬀects means that we
compare the coeﬃcients Γ(S) and Γ(L) of the household related subgroup dummy variables.
The coeﬃcient Γ(L) includes various sources of improving productivity due to individual eﬀorts
in location K (for example, formal training or learning by doing), due to knowledge spillovers in
location K, and due to reallocation eﬀects by sorting and two-sided learning between individuals
and ﬁrms. Occurrence of reallocation represents self-selection on ability. Information of matching
quality is accumulated by ﬁrm and individual after their production.
If we assume that ability does not change over time, we can say that reallocation eﬀects are
self-selective in innate (or natural) ability. If we assume that individual ability is changed over
time through learning by migrating eﬀects, we can say that reallocation eﬀects are self-selective
in acquired ability after migration. Even if any doubt remains about identiﬁcation between
learning by migrating eﬀects (i.e. individual eﬀorts and spillovers) and reallocation eﬀects, it
is clear that average productivity can be higher for a long cohort L than a short cohort S.7
To see these eﬀects, we also specify and estimate cohort diﬀerentials in estimates of reason
diﬀerentials from the cross-section wage function by following linear regressions.
7Literature on TFP show in detail that higher level in productivity among long lived ﬁrms than short lived
ﬁrms can be explained by exiting of non productive ﬁrms. This reallocation eﬀects also can be drawn from
literatures on exporting market and two-sided learning in the labour market. Our theoretical model also predicts
the natural selection or survival of the ﬁttest through job mobility.
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is is log weekly earnings for individual i in location K, Xis a vector of observable
individual characteristics (gender, age, years of education, square of years of education, marital
status), the dummy variables DK
1H(S) and DK
1H(L) equal to 1 if individual i moved with the
household head to location K and has short (long, respectively) experience in location K, and
uK
is is an error term of individual unobserved abilities φi and ﬁrm’s technology, ξis.
6.2 Empirical Results of Learning by Migrating
We also estimate the eﬀects of dummy variables DK
1H(S) and DK
1H(L) in the four migration
ﬂow subsamples: (1) rural to rural; (2) urban to rural; (3) rural to urban; and (4) urban to
urban. The coeﬃcient of dummy variable Γ means the diﬀerentials of location speciﬁc premium
between the two migrant subgroups of job-seekers and household relations in each location
K. The coeﬃcient Γ(S) means the diﬀerence of location premium for short-staying in the two
migrant groups. Same thing is true for the coeﬃcient Γ(L) for long-staying workers in the two
groups. Therefore, the diﬀerence between Γ(S) and Γ(L) represents “diﬀerence in diﬀerences”:
the diﬀerence of learning by migrating eﬀects between two types of migrants (looking for job
versus household relations) in location K. This diﬀerence G(T) is deﬁned as follows:
G(T) ≡ Γ(L) − Γ(S)
where G(T) also means the diﬀerences of improvement of average productitvity between two
types of migrants.
The expected sign of the estimates on learning by migrating eﬀects by migration are as
follows. First, the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients Γ(S) and Γ(L) for urban-rural migrant
is constant over time (i.e. the productivity diﬀerentials between job-seekers and the household
relations is not changing because of learning by migrating eﬀects by migration to the “new exit”
from the urban labour market).
H0 :Γ UR(L)=Γ UR(S) (the uniform learning by migrating eﬀects in rural area)
H1 :Γ UR(L)  =Γ UR(S)
Secondly, the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients Γ(S) and Γ(L) for rural-urban migrant is
constant over time (i.e. the productivity diﬀerentials between job-seekers and the household
19realations is not changing because of learning by migrating eﬀects among “new entrants” to the
urban labour market).
H0 :Γ RU(L)=Γ RU(S) (the uniform learning by migrating eﬀects in urban area)
H1 :Γ RU(L)  =Γ RU(S)
The estimates for each sample in Table 7 and Table 8 show that there is less reallocation
eﬀects in urban labour market and there are no learning eﬀects in urban areas for “newly exits”
from urban area: (1) the gap G(T) increases between job-seekers and household relating migrants
in the rural-rural subsample due to the sharp reallocation eﬀects for job-seeking migrants of
looking for job; (2) convergence of G(T) between job seekers and household related migrants
in the urban-rural subsample due to learning by migrating eﬀects for household relations; (3)
convergence of G(T) between job seekers and household relations in the rural-urban subsample
because of less reallocation eﬀects for less able workers in the urban market; (4) higher G(T) for
job-seekers and household relation in the urban-urban subsample due to less reallocation eﬀects
for less able workers in the urban market.
It is useful to interpretate between the share of short and the share of long duration in
each migration streams. Table 6 represents some interesting facts of similarity and diﬀerentials
between the reasons for migration. We shall now look more carefully into our empirical results.
The estimate for rural to rural subsample with short-staying in rural area shows that job-
seekers have experience of 3.5% higher wages than household related migrants. On the other
hand, for long-staying migrants in rural after migration from another rural area, job-seekers
have an experience of 6.4% higher wages than household related migrants. There is a steep rise
from short to long between two types of migrants. It seems reasonable to suppose that there
are learning by migrating eﬀects in rural areas or reallocation eﬀects gained from the sorting
process through job matching.8
From Table 3, our reallocation hypothesis seems reasonable. Increased average productivity
of job-seekers can be explained by the diﬀerences of the survival rate between the two types
of migrants: 24.2% (= 7841/32388) of job-seekers versus 33.6% (= 3124/9285) of household
relations migrants. The migrant who can not ﬁnd a good job match seems to change her
location at an early stage, before the second years (i.e. our deﬁnition is short cohort). But the
8A possible explanation is: if learning by migrating eﬀects exist, then the 2.9% gap (= 6.4% − 3.5%) between
short and long cohort can be explained by the diﬀerence of the learning speeds between the two types of migrants.
Another explanation is: if reallocation eﬀects are the main reason, then approximately 3% gap between two cohorts
can be explained by the diﬀerence of exit speeds from rural labour market between job-seekers and household
relations migrants.
20migrant who can have a good match will stay in rural area and to enter a long cohort. It is
likely that improvement in average productivity for long cohort of job-seekers can be explained
by survival of the ﬁttest in the rural to rural subsample.
The estimate for urban to rural subsample with short-staying in Table 7 shows that migrants
looking for jobs have experience of 3.2% lower wages than migrants who move with the household
head. On the other hand, for long staying migrants, migrants of looking for job has experience
of 4.4% lower wages than migrants of move with the household head. We already build up
two hypotheses: self-selection on abilities and learning by migrating eﬀects in each location. At
ﬁrst, result of short cohort shows signiﬁcant but small diﬀerences between two types of migrants.
But result of long cohort represents growth of diﬀerences between two types of migrants. This
1.2% (= 4.4% − 3.2%) gap between short and long cohort among two types of migrants can be
explained by the diﬀerence of innate ability or the diﬀerence of learning speeds in rural area.9
Exit patterns of two types of migrants are similar: 20.4% (= 1175/5768) of looking for job versus
22.6% (= 241/1066) of move with the household head. We may say that the diﬀerence of exit
patterns is not the main reasons.
Let us, for the moment, examine to urban migrants. The estimate for the rural to urban
subsample with short-staying in urban area in Table 8 shows that job-seeking migrants experi-
ence 10.4% higher wages than household relations migrants. On the other hand, for long-staying
migrants, job-seekers experience of 6.3% higher wages than household relations migrants. Gaps
between two types of migrant decrease: due to convergence of abilities between the two mi-
grant groups or due to staying in urban job-seeking. Exit patterns are also quite similar: 31.9%
(= 1689/5292) for job-seekers versus 31.4% (= 152/484) for household relations migrants. If
a young migrant has a bad match in urban area, then she will change her location to look for
another job match, average productivity of migrants in urban area can be improved over time.
We observe that this reallocation eﬀect is common for our two types of migrants. We have two
explanations: ﬁrst, if declining the reallocation eﬀects among job-seeking migrants is the main
explanation, it is likely that less able workers stay in the urban area due to the thick market.
This leads to our result of declining gap between two types of migrants. Secondly, if learning by
migrating eﬀects are the main explanation, we may say that household relations migrants catch
up with job-seeking migrants: there is an observed convergence among urban migrants.
9We already discussed that there is negative self-selectivity in ability for urban to rural movers in former
section. There is complement between ability and the learning speed. We cannot identify whether ability is main
explanation or not here. Even if any complication remains about complement, it is clear that there is gap between
two types of migrants from urban to rural area.
21Results on urban migrants show that in the urban to urban subsample, short-staying job-
seeking migrants experience 2.8% lower wages than household relations migrants. But this
estimate is insigniﬁcant. We do not observe clear diﬀerentials between two types of migrants
in the short cohort group. On the other hand, long-staying job-seeking migrants experience
10.2% lower wages than household relations migrants. We can also understand this 7.4% gap
(10.2% − 2.8%) between two cohorts due to reallocation eﬀects or due to learning by migrat-
ing eﬀects in urban areas. We shall now look more carefully into both explanations. First,
there is substantially a large diﬀerence between 22% (=335/1524) of looking for job versus 30%
(=248/827) of moving with head. If reallocation eﬀects can mainly explain the gap between
two estimates, then we will have to observe that this gap decreases: there are strong realloca-
tion eﬀects among migrants looking for jobs and sorting eﬀects force to improve their average
productivity. But this hypothesis contradicts the gap of two estimates. Average productivity
among migrants looking for jobs is decreasing. Secondly, we can refer possibility of learning by
migrating eﬀects in the urban area. It seems reasonable to say that the diﬀerentials in ability
or diﬀerentials of learning speed for two types of migrants are quite signiﬁcant on the average.
The initial gap between migrants looking for jobs and migrants who move with the household
head seems to be widening over time.
6.3 More on Learning by Migrating: the Reason for Migration
In earlier parts of the paper, we discussed the diﬀerences among learning by migrating eﬀects
due to various reasons for four migration streams. Next, we test for learning eﬀects related to
the length of stay of migrants. Two dummy variables are used to estimate the impacts of the
length of stay on productivity for two types of migrants: job-seekers and the household relations.
For job-seeking migrants (i.e. Z = 0), the dummy variable DK
S (0) is equal to 1 if individual i




1i f T = S, K for M =1∩ Z =0 ,
0i f T = L, K for M =1∩ Z =0 .
For the migrants of the household relations (i.e. Z = 1), the dummy variable DK
S (1) is equal





1i f T = S, K for M =1∩ Z =1 ,
0i f T = L, K for M =1∩ Z =1 .
To see learning by migrating eﬀects of the length of stay on productivity, we specify and estimate
reason diﬀerentials based on cohort diﬀerentials from the cross-section wage function.
22logWK
is = Xisβ +Γ S(0) · DK
S (0) + ΓS(1) · DK
S (1) + φis + ξK
is (3)
where coeﬃcient ΓS(0) captures the diﬀerence of productivity between short and long cohort
for the migrants of job-seekers, on the other hand, coeﬃcienct ΓS(1) also captures the diﬀerence
of productivity between short and long cohort for the migrants of household relations.
These coeﬃcients provide us the empirical understanding of the impact of duration on abili-
ties. There is the issue of endogeneity: each individual chooses the length of stay in location K
after migration, and the pitfall is related to comparing two coeﬃcients due to sample truncation.
But we can focus on the results of share of long-staying for two types of migrants because Ta-
ble 6 suggests same patterns of sample-attrition for job-seekers and household relations among
urban-rural migrants (i.e. 20.4% for job-seekers vs 22.6 % for household relations) and among
rural-urban migrants (i.e. 31.9% for job-seekers vs 31.4% for household relations).
Each expected sign of learning by migrating eﬀects is as follows. First, the coeﬃcient ΓS of
urban-rural migrant is negative (i.e. average productivity of migrants grows after entry into the
rural labour market).
H0 :Γ UR
S (0) ≥ 0 ∩ ΓUR
S (1) ≥ 0
H1 :Γ UR
S (0) < 0 ∩ ΓUR
S (1) < 0 (learning by migrating eﬀects in rural area)
Secondly, the coeﬃcient ΓS for the rural-urban migrant is negative (i.e. average productivity
of migrants grows after entry into the urban labour market).
H0 :Γ RU
S (0) ≥ 0 ∩ ΓRU
S (1) ≥ 0
H1 :Γ RU
S (0) < 0 ∩ ΓRU
S (1) < 0 (learning by migrating eﬀects in urban area)
Empirical results are shown in Table 9 for the rural labour market and Table 10 for the
urban labour market. There is no empirical observation of the learning by migrating eﬀects for
job-seekers in the rural area: we have no results to show that coeﬃcient is negatively signiﬁcant
at 1% level. On the other hand, we have the following observation of the learning by migrating
eﬀects for rural-rural migrants of household relations: the coeﬃcient is negatively signiﬁcant at
1% level. However, for the learning by migrating eﬀects of urban-rural migrants of household
relations, we obtained insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients. In conclusion: (1) there is no advantage for long
experienced job-seekers in the rural labour market and (2) there is advantage of long experienced
migrants of household relations in the rural labour market. The main diﬀerence by the reason
for migration seems to be derived from the diﬀerence of search intensity in the early stages after
migration.
23The empirical results in Table 10 suggest that the advantage of long experienced migrants
exists. “New entrants” to the urban labour market has negative learning by migrating eﬀects
for both job-seekers and household related migrants: the coeﬃcients are negatively signiﬁcant
at 1% level. There is advantage of staying because of thick market externalities in the urban
area. Migrants of household relations beneﬁt from staying in the urban labour market more than
migrants of job-seekers because of the duration of the search activities. Job-seeking migrants
within the urban labour market also beneﬁt from their search activities. On the other hand,
there is no advantage for household relation migrants to stay in the urban labour market: the
coeﬃcient is negative but insigniﬁcant. We therefore conclude that (1) long experienced job-
seekers gain in the urban labour market and (2) long experienced household relations migrants
to the urban area. These advantages for duration of stay come from the search activities in the
urban labour market (i.e. thick market externalities).
7 Discussions and Conclusion
Some issues remain to discuss. First, the validity of our instrumental variable used in “the
reason for migration”. Both recent works by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) and Angrist and
Krueger (2001) argue the general shortcomings about the instrumental variables due to “natural
experiment”. Our identiﬁcation strategy depends on whether moving with the household head
to a new location is orthogonal to individual abilities: following the head is exogenous. We have
to examine that the location choice for migrants who move with the household head seems to be
independent of their characteristics. Location choice seems to be exogenous for these household
relations migrants. But we can conjecture the co-location problems for husbands and wives like
Costa and Kahn (2001). If there is strategic complementarities to co-location between wives
and husbands, our identiﬁcation strategy fails. Secondly, to study the self-selection eﬀects on
abilities and the learning by migrating, we used wage worker migrants. This leads to sample
selection bias. We have to examine transitions from migrants to agricultural, self-employed, wage
workers, and household workers such as housewives. Thirdly, we do not control for the categories
of occupation, industry, and ﬁrm size. Self-selection eﬀects on abilities and the learning by
migrating eﬀects can be quite diﬀerent for these categories.
In this paper we develop a simple framework to identify the learning by migrating eﬀects
and self-selection eﬀects on abilities with instrumental variable. This is the ﬁrst attempt of the
identiﬁcation of learning by migrating eﬀects from self-selection eﬀects using exogenous sources
of variation: the reason for migration. This paper is useful to know the role of the urban labour
market: natural selection or the location of learning. Our empirical results for self-selection on
migrating are summarized below:
24• There is positive self-selection on abilities for rural-urban job-seekers signiﬁcantly.
• There is negative self-selection on abilities for urban-rural job-seekers signiﬁcantly.
In short, these rigorous inferences suggest the survival of the ﬁttest in the urban labour
market. Highly able job-seekers tend to move to the urban labour market from the rural area,
while less skilled job-seekers tend to exit from the urban labour market to the rural labour
market. The origin of migrants from the urban labour market to rural can be rural area. These
migrants (i.e. returnees) moved from the rural to the urban labour market and then back to the
rural area because of bad job-matching experience in the urban labour market. Our empirical
results for learning by migrating eﬀects are also summarized below:
• There is a convergence of productivity between rural-urban job-seeking migrants and rural-
urban household relations migrants over time.
• There is a divergence of productivity between urban-rural job-seeking migrants and urban-
rural household relations migrants over time.
It seems reasonable to say that better job-matching can be found by the rural-urban migrants
of household relations after learning where better job opportunities are located in the urban
thick market. It is due to the diﬀerence of a necessity for getting a job between job-seekers
and household relations migrants. Household relations migrants have more search or waiting
premiums than impatient job-seekers. The result for both rural-urban migrants can apply to the
result for both urban-rural migrants and urban-urban migrants but not for rural-rural migrants.
These results lead to the conclusion that there is a search option in the urban thick market.
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27Table 1: A Position of Urbanization Patterns for Thailand in the World
Rank Country Primacy Country Megalopolitan Country Urbanization
1 Thailand 24.994 Angola 0.857 UAE 0.997
2 Angola 15.520 Azerbaijan 0.846 South Korea 0.736
3 Chile 14.847 Ireland 0.841 Dominican 0.727
4 Peru 10.332 Paraguay 0.832 Lebanon 0.722
5 Lebanon 9.847 Sierra Leone 0.828 Japan 0.696
6 Sierra Leone 9.221 Lebanon 0.814 USA 0.689
7 Madagascar 9.078 Kyrgyzstan 0.785 Australia 0.659
8 Argentina 8.787 Tajikistan 0.7712 Venezuela 0.644
9 Hungary 8.707 Thailand 0.7706 Mexico 0.633
10 Mali 8.542 El Salvador 0.750 Chile 0.623
91 Ecuador 1.307 Venezuela 0.203 India 0.159
92 South Africa 1.282 South Africa 0.197 Mali 0.154
93 USA 1.267 Poland 0.173 Thailand 0.150
94 Vietnam 1.236 Germany 0.167 Tajikistan 0.147
95 China 1.194 Netherlands 0.159 Kenya 0.141
96 Cameroon 1.157 Ukraine 0.138 Madagascar 0.131
97 Australia 1.150 Russia 0.135 Sri Lanka 0.092
98 UAE 1.103 India 0.113 Niger 0.091
99 Syria 1.059 USA 0.085 Ethiopia 0.062
100 Netherlands 1.035 China 0.047 Nepal 0.056
Source: United Nations World Urban Prospects 2000.
28Table 2: Reason of migration and duration of stay
Reason 0 1 2 3 4 Total
Job-seeking 7380 5642 4601 3541 2087 23251
Job transfer 3156 3077 2792 2135 1412 12572
Medical treatment 7 3 1 3 0 14
Household relations 2719 2567 2611 2267 1498 11662
Return to former residence 2384 1402 1077 741 440 6044
Others 1062 745 603 427 254 3091
Total 16708 13436 11685 9114 5691 56634
Note. Each column shows years of stay from time of migration until the survey week. By deﬁnition, we rule out
students, self-employed, housewives, and farmers in the analysis. We focus on migrant wages worker only. Source:
Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996
29Table 3: Log weekly wage for new entrants to the rural labour market
Subsample Mean S.D Obs.
Rural to rural migrants 6.814 .663 41673
Short 6.770 .663 30708
Long 6.939 .645 10965
Job-seeking 6.825 .670 32388
Short 6.772 .674 24547
Long 6.993 .630 7841
Household relations 6.776 .633 9285
Short 6.763 .618 6161
Long 6.801 .663 3124
Urban to rural migrants 6.861 .694 6834
Short 6.810 .684 5418
Long 7.058 .697 1416
Job-seeking 6.883 .700 5768
Short 6.829 .690 4593
Long 7.094 .699 1175
Household relations 6.745 .647 1066
Short 6.706 .639 825
Long 6.880 .659 241
Note. All new entrants to rural labour market are classiﬁed by the reason for migration, migration streams, and
years of stay. All new entrants is restricted to wage workers age 40 or below. Source: Thailand Labor Force
Survey, 1994-1996
30Table 4: Log weekly wage for new entrants to the urban labour market
Subsample Mean S.D Obs.
Rural to urban migrants 6.773 .478 5776
Short 6.727 .462 3935
Long 6.873 .496 1841
Job-seeking 6.771 .474 5292
Short 6.721 .461 3603
Long 6.878 .482 1689
Household relations 6.802 .512 484
Short 6.794 .465 332
Long 6.818 .626 152
Urban to urban migrants 7.116 .531 2351
Short 7.069 .512 1768
Long 7.260 .562 583
Job-seeking 7.113 .518 1524
Short 7.074 .496 1189
Long 7.252 .569 335
Household relations 7.122 .556 827
Short 7.058 .545 579
Long 7.271 .553 248
Note. All new entrants to the rural labour market are classiﬁed by the reason for migration, migration streams,
and duration of stay. All new entrants are restricted to wage workers age 40 or below. Source: Thailand Labor
Force Survey, 1994-1996
31Table 5: Coeﬃcients of household related subgroup dummy in wage equations
Subsample Γ Adjusted R2 Obs.
Rural to rural −.045∗∗∗ .436 41673
(.005)
Urban to rural .051∗∗∗ .346 6834
(.018)
Rural to urban −.088∗∗∗ .340 5776
(.022)
Urban to urban .051∗∗∗ .445 2351
(.019)
Note. subsamples using rural (urban) migrants from rural (urban) areas. Dependent variable is log weekly wage.
Explanatory variables are gender, age, years of education, squares of years of education, marital status, and
household related subgroup dummy. All individual explanatory variables are highly signiﬁcant at 0.1% level.
This table focuses on each coeﬃcient of exogenous variable on migration decision: household related subgroup
dummy. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1 % level.
32Table 6: Relationship between the reason, migration streams, and duration
Subsample Short Long Total % of Long
Rural to rural 30708 10965 41673 26.3%
Job-seeking 24547 7841 32388 24.2%
Household relations 6161 3124 9285 33.6%
Urban to rural 5418 1416 6834 20.7%
Job-seeking 4593 1175 5768 20.4%
Household relations 825 241 1066 22.6%
Rural to urban 3935 1841 5776 31.87%
Job-seeking 3603 1689 5292 31.9%
Household relations 332 152 484 31.4%
Urban to urban 1768 583 2351 24.8%
Job-seeking 1189 335 1524 22.0%
Household relations 579 248 827 30.0%
Note. First column shows the migration streams and the reason for migration by its migration streams. Column
two shows the number of observations in a short duration: 0, 1, and 2 years. Column three shows the number of
observations in a long duration: 3 and 4 years. Column four also shows the number of whole observations. Share
of long duration belongs to the last column. Source: from Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996
33Table 7: Coeﬃcients on household related subgroup dummies in wage equations of short and
long cohort in the rural labour market
Subsample Γ Adjusted R2 Obs.










Note. Dependent variable is log weekly wage. Explanatory variables are gender, age, years of education, square of
years of education, marital status, and household relations migrants dummy. All individual explanatory variables
are highly signiﬁcant at 0.1% level. This table also focuses on each coeﬃcient of exogenous variable on migration
decision: household relations migrants dummy. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Source: Thailand
Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1 % level.
∗∗ signiﬁcant at 10 % level.
34Table 8: Coeﬃcients on household related subgroup dummies in wage equations of short and
long cohort in the urban labour market
Subsample Γ Adjusted R2 Obs.










Note. Dependent variable is log weekly wage. Explanatory variables are gender, age, years of education, square
of years of education, marital status, and household relations migrants ʟdummy. All individual explanatory
variables are highly signiﬁcant at 0.1% level. This table also focuses on each coeﬃcient of exogenous variable on
migration decision: household relations migrants ʟdummy. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Source:
Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1 % level.
∗∗ signiﬁcant at 10 % level.
35Table 9: Coeﬃcients on Short dummies in wage equations by the reason for migration in the
rural labour market
Subsample ΓS Adjusted R2 Obs.










Note. Dependent variable is log weekly wage. Explanatory variables are gender, age, years of education, square
of years of education, marital status, and Short experience dummies. All individual explanatory variables are
highly signiﬁcant at 1% level. This table also focuses on each coeﬃcient Short experience dummies. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1 % level.
36Table 10: Coeﬃcients on Short dummies in wage equations by the reason for migration in the
urban labour market
Subsample ΓS Adjusted R2 Obs.










Note. Dependent variable is log weekly wage. Explanatory variables are gender, age, years of education, square
of years of education, marital status, and Short experience dummies. All individual explanatory variables are
highly signiﬁcant at 1% level. This table also focuses on each coeﬃcient of Short experience dummies. Numbers
in parentheses are standard errors. Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994-1996
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1 % level.
37